Social computing needs a capability to reason with qualitatively fuzzy relations and analogy if it is to be capable of pattern matching using commonsense reasoning. The paper proper begins with an introduction to the first-order predicate calculus and heuristics. Using everyday simple examples, it shows where heuristic reasoning can be invaluable and where deductive reasoning falls short. The qualifier is replaced with < (i.e., for most) and the qualifier is replaced with ( (i.e., for some). That is, the realization of a heuristic calculus necessarily fuzzifies the predicate calculus. Moreover, computational analogy is shown to be possible through the use of multiple analogies. These may be defined by way of a (non-square) matrix, which serves to explain the predicates in terms of one or more disjoint predicates -including various permutations of arguments. These predicates are also subject to composition. Union and intersection operations are used to define predicates in terms of other predicates having common defining heuristic matrices. Finally, an introductory heuristic calculus is defined and exemplified. In particular, contextsensitive left and right-hand transformations are developed for the creation of knowledge, which is open under deduction. Local knowledge is validated through constraint checking and converges just short of validity.
Introduction
One of the exciting uses for computational technology is as an aid in information discovery. For example, one may know that a certain person has been a friend for 20 years, that he publishes in the area of database design, and that he lives in San Diego; but, what is his name. Clearly, similar problems have been addressed through the area of database search and retrieval and to some extent fuzzy logic and computing with words [1] [2] . However, despite the seeming similarity, these problems are not necessarily well structured. That is, what does it mean to say that someone has been a friend? Does that mean that he lived nearby (in the fuzzy sense of nearness), that he did some good deed, but for whom, that he was a good conversationalist, worker, shared the same political ideology, etc. Simply put, while some attribute entities such as, "20 years" are amenable to fuzzy search and others such as, "publishes in the area of database design" are subject to computing with words [1] [2], others as we have just shown are little more than conceptual entities. This paper introduces an inferential predicate calculus that maps otherwise unknown concepts by process of transformational analogy. A description leading to the heuristic predicate calculus follows.
On Heuristic Evidential Reasoning
Consider the first-order predicate calculus representation of friendship; namely:
Likes (Bill, Beth) Likes (Beth, Ben)
(1) Likes? (Bill, Ben) We know that the Likes relation is not transitive so we cannot conclude, on the basis of the above predicates that Likes? (Bill, Ben) is True or False. Of course, the validity of this relation is quite useful from a perspective of social information retrieval (e.g., for marketing, pushing publications, counter-terrorism operations, and a host of other unrelated applications).
Next, let us proceed to develop the heuristic calculus by noting that a fundamental property of heuristics is that unlike deduction (e.g., the predicate calculus), heuristics cannot be proven to be valid and may be in error to a variable degree. Such is never the case for purely deductive operations [3] . First, we will develop a heuristic for processing the arguments and while we can develop a heuristic for the operator, Likes, we will then proceed to develop a more exact representation of the problem. 
Define the qualifier < to mean, "for most"; then,
Equation (4) is said to be heuristic because |x| >> |y| is heuristic and thus potentially also domain-specific. All we can say given equation (4) is that it is much more likely that Likes (Ben, Ice Cream) than Likes (Ben, Ice Cream).
Next, we want to generalize the instance b so that it can serve as a heuristic filter. Here, is the development.
Now, define ( to mean, "for some". Then,
and conversely,
Equation (7) shows that Likes (Bill, Ice Cream) Likes (Beth, Ben) o Likes (Bill, Ben). Again, this is a heuristic result, which allows us to use different instantiations for x.
There are two problems with this heuristic calculus as it now stands. First and foremost, the mapping is only more likely to be true than not and second, in common with the predicate calculus and other logics, it is difficult to translate more complex problems into the formalism. These problems stem from the desire to exploit a formalism and a reticence to exploit computational search. Thus, we proceed to reformulate the problem so as to make it more amenable to heuristic search.
The context for this problem is Likes? (Bill, Ben). It follows from equations (1) and (2) that this is not deducible and hence any conclusion in this regard is subject to error. What needs to be noted however is that it is precisely those problems, which cannot be solved deductively that are of value and need to be solved heuristically.
Consider the predicate knowledge, Likes (Bill, Beth) and Likes (Beth, Ben). This knowledge needs to be merged with (2) . This can best be done by setting up a schema. We know that {Bill, Beth, Ben} People. Thus, we have the reduction of (2) Here, we face the problem of a need for greater certainty. Bernstein suggests the use of multiple analogies for greater certainty; although, he provides no formal calculus for how to do so [4] . Let us explore the use of a double analogy in the context of Likes? (Bill, Ben). So far, we've maintained the use of the single predicate relation, "Likes". Now, we will illustrate the use of a plurality of relations.
From before, we already know Likes (Ben, Ice Cream); although, we don't explicitly start with this fact. Suppose we have Buys (Ben, Ice Cream). This at first glance seems to give rise to a contradiction. However, if we then add, Buys (Beth, Ice Cream) this seeming contradiction is resolved with the understanding that Ben buys ice cream for his friend, Beth. Here,
But, equation (2) But, equations (2) and (12) are fused with the resultant implication being, Likes (Ben, Ice Cream). This supposition was used to arrive at equation (10). Since this supposition was on the path to the induction of the first analogy, it offers a corroborating second analogy and the evidence for Likes (Bill, Ben) is thereby increased. While heuristic search clearly increases the certainty of belief, and while the certainty of this belief is never 100 percent, the next issue pertains to how to metricize the uncertainty. Clearly, the answer is to use heuristic search to do so as follows. It also must be the case that any expansion of terms, performed to accumulate heuristic evidence, requires heuristic support to know what node(s) to expand next. This is proper because heuristic search need not be admissible [3] .
The Heuristic Matrix
In this section, we will attempt to generalize the previous example into principled reasoning, which may be applied to arrive at a heuristic calculus. Again, heuristics are not necessarily valid. To begin, the calculus requires a set of constraints. Axioms serve this purpose. They take the form:
This creates a matrix of constraints, where each column heads a distinct predicate and each row heads a distinct (ordered) set of objects. The matrix need not be square. The value of the defining matrix is said to be True just in case each element of the matrix evaluates to True. For example, here is a small database, which exemplifies the friendship relation:
Likes i j Knows i j Likes j i Knows j i ® (16)
Next, while a set of constraints is sufficient to enable us to perform deductive reasoning using the predicate calculus, we are interested in inductive reasoning using a heuristic calculus. To continue with the preceding example, suppose that we have Friends (i, j) and Friends (j, k). We know that friends is not a transitive relation, but wish to use the heuristic calculus to predict whether it is more likely that Friends (i, k) or Friends (i, k). More information is needed. Thus, suppose that we also know,
where, the | indicates that the three arguments are considered independently. Thus, j golfs just in case he (she) drives and puts. Next, suppose that we have the following additional information.
Likes m Golfs n Knows m Golfs n Likes Golfs n m Knows Golfs n m ® (18)
Here, m and n are friends just in case each likes and knows the other and n plays golf. This last stipulation makes it clear that Friends (i, k) is more likely than not, since i, j, and k all share in their love of golf. We say that,
Thus,
In other words, if i is friends with someone who plays golf and k is friends with this same golf player, then it is more likely, but not assured that i and k are friends than if it was unknown if this person played golf. Friendship can also be established in multiple ways -some of which involve multiple analogies and others, which involve partially ordering the predicate definition as will be seen in what follows. First, consider,
Thus, if a pair of people are friends with someone who does not hunt, then it is more likely, but not assured that this pair are friends than enemies. Moreover, substituting equation ( 
Thus, if a pair of people are friends with someone who does not hunt (21) and fishes (23), then it is more likely, but not assured that this pair are friends than enemiesincluding if just friends with someone who does not hunt (21), or if just friends with someone who fishes (23). In other words, if hundreds or even thousands of such bits of evidential reasoning were taken into account, then heuristic reasoning could approach the validity of deductive reasoning; albeit, with far more explorative power, since it is inductive -not deductive. Next, observe that Drives and Puts are strict subsets of Golfs. This means that the possibility of any friendship derived from Golfs will be greater than any possibility derived from Drives or Puts alone, which in turn will be greater than any possibility derived without the benefit of this disjunctive pair.
Of course, in the "real world" such relations may be daisy-chained and heterarchical. This suggests that perhaps the best way for computing possibilities is to map them using cases, where updates for any given case take the form, New possibility = (previous possibility + {0 | 1})/2 (24) Next, consider the situation where the matrix definition allows for the induction of relations. Such relations need not be explicitly specified as is done in the predicate calculus. Rather, they are heuristically induced and thus are all but assured. Here, as in their use in the formation of multiple analogies, the possibility of such relations increases in proportion to the number of paths by which they may be arrived at. For example,
Talks to i j Knows i j Talks to j i Knows j i ®
Married (i, j) = ( , ), _ ( , )(25)
, _ ( , )

Likes i j Talks to i j Likes j i Talks to j i ® (26)
The union of equations (25) and (26) produce a superset definition of equation (16). Thus, we may update our definition of friends as follows.
Conversely (with humor), notice that some married people are friends. Similarly, people who just talk to each other may be acquaintances, friends, or married:
Furthermore, for this to hold, it must be the case that,
Hence, the heuristic matrix admits abductive reasoning. If (29) were known to be False, then it might be redefined as (30) and a new term would need to be acquired to define the left-hand side in equation (28).
This approach can lead to a powerful heuristic calculus for the induction of knowledge, which need not be valid, but, which can be ascribed possibilities.
A Heuristic Calculus
In Similarly, by the composition of (33) and (34) we obtain:
We want to know if there exists a girl who likes ice cream in the absence of hot weather. Notice that just because someone likes candy does not insure that they are a girl. Clearly, there is no way to deduce the requested information using the second-order predicate calculus here. Equating the right-hand sides of (31) and (32) yields,
x Boy (x) l x Boy (x) Weather (hot) | Likes (x, ice cream) (37)
Substituting z for x, y; equating the right-hand sides of (32) and (33); and, substituting results into (37) yields,
It then heuristically follows that the universal qualifier in (38) can be replaced by the existential qualifier,
Weather (hot) was removed for boys and it can be removed for girls because it shares the same right-hand side; namely, Likes (z, ice cream) and because the pattern of changing a universal qualifier to an existential qualifier can be followed for the girls -just like for the boys. Thus, (36) may be rewritten as,
Equation (40) makes it clear that it is highly likely, but not assured, that there exists a girl who likes ice cream in the absence of hot weather. It is interesting to note that equation (40) reflects this uncertainty, since it is never necessary, strictly speaking, for the first predicate to be satisfied to invoke the implication. Just as (31), (32), and (33) can be combined, it is also possible to equate non deterministic left-hand sides in the manner just illustrated. Moreover, instances may be proper subsets and we may also introduce , < ( for "for most" and "for some", respectively. In the previous example, instead of replacing with , we could have developed it to replace < with ( for a somewhat more general result. In addition, compositions may find practical use. Possibilities may be computed using a calculation proportional to the number of derivational paths (i.e., one was shown here). Finally, whenever there is an error, the correct resulting equation must be acquired to correct the inductive mechanism by way of eliminating the need for inferential reasoning here.
It should be practical to establish rules of inference for the heuristic calculus just as has been done for the predicate calculus. The heuristic calculus is not subject to essential incompleteness [5] and need not ever be intractable because heuristics can be applied to speed up inferences as well as resolutions -so long as a slight loss of validity is acceptable. Next, an example of the heuristic calculus as applied to non deterministic reasoning will be provided.
Many processes are inherently stochastic. Here, there may be more than one correct answer and any attempt to reduce them to a single correct answer is done strictly as a matter of convenience. Consider a move in chess, which is similar to battle management, where say a Knight forks the pair of opponent Rooks, where necessarily limited look-ahead cannot resolve which Rook, if any, to take. W represents white and B represents black.
Search ((Take (BRook1), Take (BRook2)) o Take (BRook2)
Equations (42) and (43) are non deterministic as sometimes limited or even heuristic search can not resolve between two or more actions. Here, both are proper.
This says that if the black Rook can attack some pieces and some of our pieces can take the black Rook and our King is not in check, then take the first black Rook. Of course, there are other concerns in a real chess game, such as the relative point value of all exchanged pieces, the potential setup for a checkmate, and the like. These will be ignored for the sake of simplicity of exposition.
Equating the left-hand sides of (42) and (43), we obtain, Search ((Take (BRook1), Take (BRook2)) | Take (BRook1) l Take (BRook2)
Here, the contextual match is a little more difficult to achieve than in our previous example. That is,
Proper subsets are defined to satisfy their contextual requirements. Substituting (45) into (44) twice yields,
At first glance, this new heuristic rule, which is not deducible on the basis of the given knowledge, is atypical. That is, one would have expected to also see, ( x Attack (BRook2, x), but this was not pattern matched and hence remains unaltered. Basically, the induced rule says something to the effect, "If your first black Rook attacks me and I'm not in check, I can and will take your second black Rook." This makes for an interesting game. If we wanted to also induce a heuristic rule to counter the imminent attack by the first black Rook, we could include the following pair of simple rules.
Here, it is understood that, Take (BRooki) {Take (BRook1), Take (BRook2)} (50) Thus,
Applying (51) to (47) gives the result:
Errors of transformation are caught through the use of constraint checking. This does not imply that everything that passes constraint checking is valid. Rather, passing the constraint checker simply insures that it is logical for the scope of recorded information. Since this information is potentially infinite, it follows that while the results of heuristic inference are far more likely to be valid than not, validity is not assured.
Capstone
A heuristic calculus is potentially far more complex than the predicate calculus, but all of this additional complexity stems from heuristic inference, constraint checking, and related search. The heuristic nature of this search makes it possible to fuzzify the predicate calculus by replacing with < (i.e., for most) and with ( (i.e., for some). Algorithmic methods have been found to effect this constraint checking on a large scale, where the issue of knowledge representation is lies at the focus.
The heuristic calculus is particularly applicable to social information engineering because relations among humans are rarely Boolean, discrete, limited, and/or formalizable. Rather, human relations require pliable reasoning, concept formation, and learning. Human relations are qualitative and that orientation is a matter of degree. Fuzzy logic and even computing with words [1] [2] does not and cannot capture that, which the heuristic calculus can. Heuristic and fuzzy qualitative learning are the underpinning reasons for this differential.
Conclusions
A heuristic calculus is needed to address the vast number of problems, which are open under deduction and thus not solvable using the predicate calculus, or any equivalent logic. Commonsense reasoning introduces not only quantitative uncertainty, but qualitative uncertainty as well. Computing with concepts requires granularizationreplacing the universal qualifier with "for most" and replacing the existential qualifier with "for some". Moreover, it requires a departure from the notion of absolute validity in favor of local validity. Local validity is a function of constraint checking and thus, given sufficient parallel processing, approaches absolute validity with scale. Methodologies for constraint checking are pending development and thus were not addressed in this paper. Furthermore, the heuristic calculus can be used to circumvent the intractability of resolution theorem proving -not only by heuristically resolving the backcut mechanism of Prologue [3] , but through the acquisition of heuristics, which can do more for speedup than say granularization alone. But, the main benefit is an attendant capability for commonsense reasoning.
